

## Message Text

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PAGE 01 STATE 191791  
ORIGIN ACDA-12

INFO OCT-01 EUR-12 NEA-10 ISO-00 SS-15 NSC-05 A-01  
SP-02 OES-09 PM-05 CIAE-00 DODE-00 H-01 INR-10  
L-03 NSAE-00 PA-01 ICA-11 IO-13 EB-08 NRC-05  
SOE-02 DOE-15 CEQ-01 /142 R

DRAFTED BY ACDA/NP:CVAN DOREN:AAJ  
APPROVED BY STATE:T:JNYE  
NSC:TTHORNTON  
NEA:ATHIBAULT  
A/S:PFARLEY (SUBS)  
S/P:TMORAN  
OES:LNOSENZO (SUBS)  
PM:ALOCKE

-----011379 290224Z /75

P 282258Z JUL 78  
FM SECSTATE WASHDC  
TO AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI PRIORITY  
INFO AMCONSUL BOMBAY PRIORITY  
AMEMBASSY LONDON  
AMEMBASSY VIENNA PRIORITY

C O N F I D E N T I A L STATE 191791

USIAEA

E.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: MNUC, TECH, US, IN

SUBJECT: INTERNATIONAL COMMITTEE ON SAFEGUARDS

-

REF: (A) NEW DELHI 10869 (B) NEW DELHI 11468  
(C) VIENNA 6780

1. AS EMBASSY AWARE, INDIAN IDEA OF HIGH LEVEL, INDEPEN-  
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DENT COMMITTEE OF SCIENTISTS TO EXAMINE SAFEGUARDS QUES-  
TIONS, THOUGH POTENTIALLY HELPFUL IN SHOWING THAT INDIA  
TAKES SERIOUSLY THE NEED TO DEAL WITH HORIZONTAL PROLIFERA-  
TION AND TO SHOW MOVEMENT TOWARD REQUIREMENTS IN SPARKMAN  
LETTER, IS A HIGHLY RISKY ONE. WHILE WE STILL HOPE IT CAN  
BE SHAPED IN SUCH A WAY THAT IT WILL HELP GAIN INDIAN PUB-  
LIC ACCEPTANCE OF FULL SCOPE IAEA SAFEGUARDS AS NOT IM-

POSING ANY SIGNIFICANT BURDEN ON INDIA OR INTERFERING WITH ITS NUCLEAR PROGRAM OR PLANS, THE PRINCIPAL RISKS ARE (A) CHOICE OF COMMITTEE MEMBERS WHO MIGHT BE HOSTILE TO IAEA SAFEGUARDS, AND (B) ENLARGEMENT OF THE COMMITTEE'S MANDATE TO ADDRESS QUESTION OF ADEQUACY, EFFICACY, THE NEED FOR, OR ALTERNATIVES TO, IAEA SAFEGUARDS. IT WOULD CLEARLY BE MOST COUNTERPRODUCTIVE TO ESTABLISH A GROUP THAT WOULD UNDERCUT OUR STRONG INTEREST IN PROMOTING UNIVERSAL IAEA SAFEGUARDS COVERAGE OR OUR EFFORTS TO WORK QUIETLY FROM WITHIN FOR

THEIR IMPROVEMENT. THE IAEA ITSELF HAS A GROUP OF INTERNATIONAL EXPERT ADVISERS ON SAFEGUARDS IMPROVEMENT, THE SPECIAL ADVISORY GROUP ON SAFEGUARDS IMPLEMENTATION (SAGSI OF WHICH SETHNA IS A MEMBER), AND HAS BEEN DOING INTENSIVE ANNUAL REVIEWS OF SAFEGUARDS PERFORMANCE (THE SAFEGUARDS IMPLEMENTATION REPORTS), AND IT IS IMPORTANT NOT TO UNDERCUT THESE EFFORTS. MOREOVER, WE ARE AT EXTREMELY DELICATE STAGE OF IAEA-EURATOM SAFEGUARDS DISCUSSIONS WHICH WE WOULD NOT WISH TO PREJUDICE BY ANY SUGGESTION THAT THERE IS A POTENTIALLY ACCEPTABLE ALTERNATIVE TO EFFECTIVE IAEA SAFEGUARDS.

2. THE NON-PAPER NYE GAVE TO SHANKAR IN WASHINGTON SOUGHT TO DESIGN AROUND THOSE PITFALLS BY NARROWLY DEFINING THE TERMS OF REFERENCE AND PROVIDING FOR SELECTION OF THE EXPERTS BY A PROCESS SIMILAR TO THAT USED FOR ARBITRAL  
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TRIBUNALS--I.E., THE INDIAN AND US EXPERTS WOULD HAVE TO MUTUALLY AGREE ON THE OTHER EXPERTS.

3. REPORT IN REFTEL A RENEWS OUR CONCERN THAT WE ARE STILL NOT OVER THESE HURDLES. ON SELECTION OF GROUP, WE ARE PARTICULARLY LEERY OF HAVING AN EXPERT FROM BRAZIL OR ARGENTINA; WE NOTE THAT THE FRENCH CAN HARDLY CLAIM TO HAVE HAD MUCH EXPERIENCE IN THE EFFECTS OF BEING SUBJECTED TO SAFEGUARDS; AND WE ARE CONCERNED ABOUT SPECIFIC INDIVIDUALS THAT MIGHT BE NAMED BY OTHER COUNTRIES LISTED. WE BELIEVE EXPERTS FROM NNWS SHOULD BE FROM THOSE WHICH HAVE ACCEPTED FULL SCOPE SAFEGUARDS, SINCE THESE ARE THE ONLY ONES WHO COULD SPEAK AUTHORITATIVELY ON THEIR IMPACT ON NATIONAL PROGRAMS. INCLUSION OF AN EXPERT FROM AN EASTERN EUROPEAN NON-NUCLEAR WEAPON STATE WOULD BE SUPPORTIVE OF OUR OBJECTIVES.

4. ON MANDATE, WE SEE THE MERIT, FROM THE POINT OF VIEW OF PERSUADING THE INDIAN PUBLIC, OF LOOKING AT THE EXPERIENCE OF OTHER STATES WITH SAFEGUARDS RATHER THAN CONFINING THE STUDY TO THE IMPACT IN INDIA. BUT WE FIND OMINOUS THE OTHER SHANKAR REMARKS CITED IN PARA 2 OF REFTEL, WHICH

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5. UK EMBASSY HERE BRIEFED US ON THE INSTRUCTIONS THOMSON  
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CONSEQUENT SETBACK IN OUR RELATIONS ON THIS DELICATE  
SUBJECT. VANCE

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PAGE 01 STATE 191791 POSS DUPE  
ORIGIN EUR-03

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 SS-05 /009 R

66011

DRAFTED BY:EUR/RPE WILLIAM R. SALISBURY

APPROVED BY:EUR/RPE:RMBEAUDRY

T/D:DWELCH

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R 010211Z AUG 78

FM SECSTATE WASHDC

INFO AMEMBASSY BRUSSELS 0000

C O N F I D E N T I A L STATE 191791

BRUSSELS FOR USEEC

FOLLOWING REPEAT STATE 191791 ACTION NEW DELHI INFO BOMBAY LONDON  
VIENNA 28 JUL.

QUOTE: C O N F I D E N T I A L STATE 191791

USIAEA

E.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: MNUC, TECH, US, IN

SUBJECT: INTERNATIONAL COMMITTEE ON SAFEGUARDS

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UNQUOTE VANCE

ACDA/ISO,SS,EUR,NEA,NSC,A,SP,OES,PM,POLI,PUAE.

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## Message Attributes

**Automatic Decaptioning:** X  
**Capture Date:** 01 jan 1994  
**Channel Indicators:** n/a  
**Current Classification:** UNCLASSIFIED  
**Concepts:** COMMITTEES, NUCLEAR SAFEGUARDS  
**Control Number:** n/a  
**Copy:** SINGLE  
**Draft Date:** 28 jul 1978  
**Decaption Date:** 01 jan 1960  
**Decaption Note:**  
**Disposition Action:** RELEASED  
**Disposition Approved on Date:**  
**Disposition Case Number:** n/a  
**Disposition Comment:** 25 YEAR REVIEW  
**Disposition Date:** 20 Mar 2014  
**Disposition Event:**  
**Disposition History:** n/a  
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**Original Handling Restrictions:** n/a  
**Original Previous Classification:** n/a  
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**Reference:** 78 NEW DELHI 10869, 78 NEW DELHI 11468, 78 VIENNA 6780  
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**TAGS:** MNUC, TECH, US, IN  
**To:** NEW DELHI USIAEA  
**Type:** TE  
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**Review Markings:**  
Sheryl P. Walter  
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